Legislative voting in the pork-dominant parliament: evidence from the Philippine House of Representatives

Jae Hyeok Shin

Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea

ABSTRACT
In this paper I investigate how legislators behave in extremely pork-oriented, or pork-dominant, systems where virtually no party-line voting takes place and politicians strive to deliver individual/local benefits instead of national public policies. I argue that, in the pork-dominant context, most legislators vote with the president, who controls access to the pork pipeline, irrespective of their party affiliations. Thus, the president’s party legislators should have little incentive to vote against the president, regardless of voter demands for pork or policy; however, sometimes opposition-party legislators elected particularly from more-developed districts (where voters often desire policy over pork) should have strong incentives to vote against the president. These arguments are supported with quantitative studies of the post-authoritarian Philippine House of Representatives. It is found that, in the highly homogeneous legislature dominated by pork-seeking politicians, (1) most bills are passed with unanimous or near-unanimous consent, (2) governing-party legislators almost always vote with the majority of the members of the parliament, regardless of voters’ socio-economic conditions, and (3) opposition-party legislators, especially in more-developed areas, tend to vote against the parliamentary majority. These findings indicate that voters’ high socio-economic status promotes programmatic accountability, leading their representatives to undermine voting unity within the extremely cohesive pork-dominant legislature.

KEYWORDS Legislative behaviour; roll-call vote; voter demands; access to resources; pork-dominant system; the Philippines

Most studies of legislative voting are based on the assumption that party leaders impose discipline on rank-and-file legislators for party unity because they seek to pass bills to deliver national public policies that voters demand. Hence, they suggest that a variety of factors, including electoral institutions and ideological distance between legislator and party, influence legislators’ decisions to vote with or defect from the party line (Bowler, Farrell, & Katz, 1999; Herron, 2002; Hix, 2004; Jun & Hix, 2010; Nemoto, 2009;
Nemoto, Krauss, & Pekkanen, 2008; Nokken, 2000). But how do legislators behave in extremely pork-oriented systems where virtually no party-line voting takes place and legislators strive to deliver local and individual benefits instead of policy? This paper argues that, in the pork-dominant parliament, most legislators vote with the president (or the prime minister), who controls access to the pork pipeline, irrespective of their party affilia

Thus, the president’s party legislators should have little incentive to vote against the president, regardless of voter demands for pork or policy; however, sometimes opposition-party legislators elected particularly from more-developed districts (where voters often desire policy over pork) should have strong incentives to vote against the president.

Where policy plays a large role in garnering votes, rank-and-file party members tend to be more disciplined (Carey, 2007; Carey & Shugart, 1995). Because most programmatic goods can be delivered only through the passage of bills, which requires the support of the majority of legislators, voting coherence among party members facilitates the delivery of such goods (Desposato, 2001). Thus, party discipline is expected to be high in the policy-oriented context, regardless of whether a given party is in the majority (Shin, 2017).

Conversely, in pork-oriented contexts, rank-and-file party members tend to be less disciplined in order to deliver particularistic benefits to constituents (Carey, 2007; Desposato, 2006). When pork allocation is centralised in the president and their party is not a part of the president’s coalition, for instance, politicians may want to defect from party lines and vote with the president to gain access to the pork pipeline. Two approaches have evolved to explain what leads electoral competition to be centred on delivering pork instead of policy: contextualism and institutionalism (Shin, 2013).

On the one hand, the contextualists contend that pork-barrel politics is more prevalent in less-developed areas (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Scott, 1972). In addition to the fact that constituents in less-developed regions need more public infrastructure (Desposato, 2006), poor, less-educated voters prefer tangible benefits because poverty gives them short-term horizons and because individual benefits are easy to monitor, unlike programmatic goods (Scott, 1972).

The institutionalists, on the other hand, claim that electoral rules that induce candidate-centred campaigns spur pork-barrel politics (Carey & Shugart, 1995). They argue that candidate-centred electoral rules, such as primary system and open-list proportional representation, in which party leaders lack control over ballot access or in which candidates compete against copartisans for voter support, encourage politicians to develop personal reputations with constituents rather than party policy reputations in order to increase their electoral chances. The more candidate-centred electoral competition is, therefore, the more likely politicians are to focus on delivering individual and local benefits.
Hence it is expected and corroborated with empirical studies that legislators often defect from the majority of their copartisans (assuming that party-line voting takes place on every bill) in less-developed countries where voters desire pork or under candidate-centred electoral institutions (Carey, 2007; Desposato, 2006; Haspel, Remington, & Smith, 1998; Hix, 2004; Kunicova & Remington, 2008; Nemoto, 2009; Persson, Tabellini, & Trebbi, 2003; Sieberer, 2010). Yet it is seldom obvious how legislators vote in less-developed countries with highly candidate-centred electoral rules. What accounts for legislative voting behaviours in such extremely pork-centric, or pork-dominant, systems where almost all legislators seek access to pork pipelines and where absolutely no discipline is imposed on party rank-and-file?

Here, this study aims to address this question by examining one of the most pork-dominant systems in the world, the Philippine House of Representatives, using new data on the roll-call votes of all post-authoritarian legislators from 1987 to 2007. The study finds that, in the highly homogeneous legislature dominated by pork-seeking legislators, (1) most bills are passed with unanimous or near-unanimous consent, (2) governing-party legislators almost always vote with the majority of the members of the parliament, regardless of voters’ socio-economic conditions, and (3) opposition-party legislators, especially in more-developed areas, tend to vote against the parliamentary majority. This is because most legislators engage in logrolling and have little incentive to block any policy bills, including the president’s bills; however, opposition politicians who care to deliver programmatic goods sometimes have strong incentives to oppose certain policies.

These findings shed light on the legislative behaviour of politicians in pork-centric systems. Pre-existing studies have revealed that opposition party legislators in less-developed regions are more likely to defect from their parties to gain access to government resources for pork (Desposato, 2001, 2006). In contrast, examining roll-call votes of legislators in an extremely pork-centric (pork-dominant) system where almost everyone sides with the president who controls pork pipelines and where no party-line voting takes place whatsoever, this research shows that opposition party members in more-developed regions are more likely to defect from the entire legislature that is exceedingly cohesive to distribute pork.

This suggests that voters’ high socio-economic status promotes programmatic accountability of politicians/parties even in pork-dominant systems. We know that well-off, well-educated voters help raise the programmatic accountability because they tend to desire policy over pork, which leads politicians/parties to be disciplined to deliver promised programmatic goods (or to prevent undesirable policy bills from being passed) (Desposato, 2001, 2006; Shin, 2015). Where almost all politicians strive to deliver only pork, just passing most bills with little obstructionism, however, only those who are
elected from more-developed regions (where voters often desire programmatic goods) have some incentives to object to certain policy bills, which leads them to undermine voting unity within the extraordinarily cohesive, pork-dominant legislature. Hence, it can be inferred that improving voters’ socio-economic conditions will help induce politicians to be more accountable to the programmatic demands of their constituents even in pork-dominant systems.

The paper proceeds as follows. The following section presents an overview of the pork-dominant system in the Philippines. Section 2 provides detailed theories of how legislators vote in the pork-dominant system. Section 3 describes the data, statistical model, and measures for testing those theories. Section 4 demonstrates the results of the empirical test, and discussions of the findings and conclusion follow in section 5.

Overview: the pork-dominant system in the Philippines

Since colonial times, powerful families have dominated local politics in the Philippines (Anderson, 1998; Franco, 2001; Hutchcroft, 1998; Land, 1965; Quimpo, 2005; Sidel, 1997). In the pre-authoritarian era, although a nationalised two-party system—Nacionalista and Liberal—was established,

[the] national parties, rather than being the highly centralized parties of so many new nations, [were] loose federations or alliances among independent factional leaders in the provinces who [held] through familial and other powerful ties a primary claim upon the loyalty of the people of their localities. (Land, 1965, pp. 24–25)

Because those local factional leaders controlled a large number of votes in the provinces, the national party leaders strove to obtain the support of the local bosses in order to increase their electoral chances (Shin, 2013). The majority of the local people were poor and less educated, they thus desired tangible local and individual benefits; hence, national party leaders provided the local leaders with resources for such particularistic benefits, or pork, which helped the factional leaders to maintain the loyalty of the locals (Land, 1965, pp. 79–83). That is, national leaders granted local leaders access to pork pipelines in exchange for electoral support from the provinces.

During the authoritarian era, even though national leaders of the dictator’s party (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, New Society Movement [KBL]) were less dependent on the local bosses for electoral success, opposition party leaders, who lacked access to state resources for pork, had to rely heavily on those local bosses, because most of the local leaders retained a powerful support base in the provinces (Shin, 2013). After the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in a ‘people power’ uprising in March 1986, when the opposition
leaders returned to power, therefore, these wealthy local families regained a strong influence in national politics.

In addition to the powerful patronage networks, the single-member district plurality rule (or first past the post, [FPTP]), under which the candidate who receives the most votes wins in each constituency, has bolstered such patronage politics. The Philippine FPTP was highly candidate centred (until a new standard printed ballot that contains candidate names and party labels was introduced in 2010) in that neither candidate names nor party labels were printed on ballots and voters must write candidates’ names in the blanks on the ballot. Furthermore, party leaders do not have tight control over the party’s rank and file because politicians who failed to receive a party endorsement can run as independents. Consequently, politicians tend to have strong incentives to cultivate personal reputations with constituents delivering pork and patronage, which has led almost all the legislators to join the president’s party or coalition irrespective of their original party affiliations in order to gain access to government resources for such benefits (Hicken, 2002; Kasuya, 2009; Montinola, 1999).

In short, as a result of the country’s perennial patronage politics bolstered with an extremely candidate-centred electoral system, Philippine politicians tend to be preoccupied about delivering pork (instead of policy) to voters, and hence virtually no opposition parties that vote frequently against the president’s bills exist. How then do legislators behave in legislative voting in such a pork-dominant context? The following sections are devoted to addressing this question.

**Theories of legislative behaviours in pork-dominant systems**

Normally, strong party discipline in legislative voting has a twofold implication. On the one hand, it helps a party pass bills to achieve collective policy goals; on the other hand, it often prevents individual legislators from responding to the particularistic demands of their constituents (Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Hicken & Simmons, 2008; O’Dwyer, 2006). In other words, where politicians are disciplined to deliver programmatic goods (e.g. universal health care, national pension plan), voters who desire individual/local benefits (e.g. money, jobs, local projects) may be dissatisfied with their representatives. Conversely, where politicians deviate frequently from their party lines to deliver such particularistic goods, those who desire national public policies may be discontented.

Because politicians tend to devote their attention to what the majority of constituents demand in order to increase their electoral chances in the subsequent election (Desposato, 2006; Mayhew, 1974), it is likely that they are more disciplined where the majority of voters desire programmatic goods, or policy, but less disciplined where the majority desire particularistic
goods, or pork. The pre-existing research shows that poor, less-educated voters tend to desire pork over policy (Shin, 2015). Hence we can expect that, in general, politicians from less-developed countries/districts are more likely to deviate from the party line in an effort to gain access to resources for pork (Desposato, 2001).

In most developing countries, only governments can provide resources for pork and patronage and the president controls access to such resources. Consequently, members of the president’s party or coalition can be expected to cast legislative votes in a disciplined way in order to avoid losing access to resources. Once a party is off the president’s gravy train, its members may vote with the president where they need to deliver particularistic benefits, leading to lower discipline in opposition parties. Hence it is typically expected that opposition politicians from less-developed districts are more likely to deviate from the majority of copartisans in legislative voting (Desposato, 2001).

In extremely pork-oriented contexts where most politicians strive to deliver particularistic goods using state resources, however, almost all of them side with the president in legislative voting irrespective of their original party affiliations. Accordingly, in those pork-dominant systems where virtually all politicians seek access to government resources, because legislators vote on the floor of the legislature as if they affiliate with the same party, presumably with the president’s party, we can expect that policy bills will be passed without significant obstructions. Moreover, because politicians maintain an awareness of the importance of the delivery of pork and individual benefits to constituents in order to win the election, the expectation is that all legislators will engage in logrolling of pork-barrel legislation. Hence legislative obstructionism will be extremely rare in pork-dominant systems.

**Hypothesis 1.** Most bills are passed with unanimous or near-unanimous consent in pork-dominant systems.

In unusual cases, however, some politicians deviate from the preferences of the majority of the members of the parliament in legislative voting. Which legislators, then, defect in such an extremely homogeneous legislative body? Assuming that all politicians approve pork-barrel legislation (logrolling), only the bills or motions that aim to deliver national public policies to voters should receive negative votes if some politicians have a reason to oppose those policies. Considering that well-educated, well-off voters often desire policy over pork (Shin, 2015), sometimes politicians elected from more-developed districts should have strong incentives to object to a policy that may conflict with the interests of their constituents. It is expected, therefore, that politicians from more-developed constituencies occasionally deviate from the majority of fellow MPs in legislative voting.
Nonetheless, voter demands for policy stemming from the voter’s socio-economic conditions have varying effects on the legislator’s decision regarding voting defection depending on her party affiliation. Members of the president’s party, for instance, should be less likely to defect from the legislative majority even when constituents desire policy, because those who voted for the president’s party candidate should expect to receive the promised programmatic goods from the president. Hence we can expect governing-party members to be highly cohesive in legislative voting irrespective of whether their constituents demand pork or policy. In contrast to those president’s party members, opposition legislators from more-developed districts where voters often desire policy over pork should sometimes defect from the legislative majority (who always vote with the president) when their policy goals differ from those of the president. We can accordingly expect that, in the pork-dominant system, only opposition politicians from more-developed districts sometimes deviate from the position of the parliamentary majority in legislative voting.

**Hypothesis 2.** Governing-party members are less likely to defect from the parliamentary majority’s preferences in legislative voting regardless of voters’ socio-economic conditions in pork-dominant systems.

**Hypothesis 3.** Opposition-party members who are elected from more-developed districts are more likely to defect from the parliamentary majority’s preferences in legislative voting in pork-dominant systems.

**Data, model, and measures**

In order to examine legislative behaviour in the pork-dominant system, a new dataset is built to contain information about all bills and motions, including resolutions and committee reports, that have been roll-call voted in the Philippine House of Representatives from the 8th Congress (1987–1992) through the 13th Congress (2004–2007). Then, to analyze individual politicians’ voting behaviours, collected are the roll-call votes of all legislators for bills and motions that receive at least one negative vote (see Appendix Table A1).

To explore the individual voting behaviour of politicians in the extremely pork-oriented legislature (Hypotheses 2 and 3), an ordinal variable, Defect$_{ij}$, is created, which measures how strongly legislator $i$ defects from the preference of the legislative majority when casting a roll-call vote on bill $j$. In contrast to the existing studies that use a dummy variable indicating whether a legislator defects, abstention is included in the middle because politicians tend to say ‘abstain’ instead of staying quiet and being treated as not present when they want to deviate from the party majority but their willingness to deviate is not as strong as when casting a salient vote counting against the preferences.
of the majority. Accordingly, \( \text{Defect}_{ij} \) is coded 2 if a roll-call vote of the legislator differs from those of the parliamentary majority; 1 if abstain; 0 otherwise. The independent variables include voter demands, access to resources, and controls. Because the dependent variable is ordinal, an ordered logit regression model is used:

\[
\text{Defect}_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \text{Voter Demands}_{ij} + \beta_2 \times \text{Access to Resources}_{ij} + \beta_3 \times \text{Controls}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}
\]

**Voter demands**

The socio-economic status of voters largely influences the type of benefits that they demand from their representatives (Desposato, 2006). The study relies on the mean education level of voters in each district as a proxy for constituent demands, because less-educated voters tend to be poor and thus to prefer pork and patronage over public policies, whereas the well-educated tend to be well-off and to prefer policy over pork (Shin, 2015). \( \text{Education}_{ij} \) represents the proportion of legislator \( i \)'s constituents who received tertiary education beyond high school, including college, university, and vocational schools (when casting a roll-call vote on bill \( j \)). District-level census data are used, and the proportion varies from .07 to .63, with a mean of .27, in the dataset. Because the expectation is that politicians from developed districts, where voters are well-educated and thus often desire policy over pork, are more likely to defect from the legislative majority in the pork-dominant system, \( \text{Education}_{ij} \) is expected to have a positive effect on \( \text{Defect}_{ij} \).

**Access to resources**

In the Philippines, where pork allocation is centralised in the president, legislators in the president’s party are granted access to the pork pipeline. Conversely, because opposition-party legislators lack access to resources, they should have strong incentives to switch to the president’s party or vote with the president. The Commission on Elections provided the information about the party affiliation of legislators in elections. Nonetheless, in order to properly test the hypotheses of access to resources and legislative voting, we need to know the party affiliation when legislators cast a roll-call vote. Unfortunately, because party switching is frequent and because few political observers care about which party politicians affiliate with during legislative sessions, it was impossible to keep track of the party affiliation of each legislator from one election to another. As most members of the House of Representatives who are elected in single-member districts are free to switch parties during legislative sessions, access to state resources is critical to the choice of party affiliation in the pork-dominant system. Hence almost all governing-
party members who affiliated with the president’s party in the election should retain their party affiliation, whereas opposition-party members should often switch to the president’s party after the election (Hicken, 2009; Kasuya, 2009).

One could consider opposition politicians who affiliate with the president’s party in the subsequent election to be members of the governing party during the entire legislative session. In this study, however, I assume that all legislators remain in their original parties (stay put) for the greater part of the legislative session after an election. There are at least three factors justifying this assumption. First, as mentioned above, members of the president’s party are highly likely to stay put. Second, even though many opposition legislators would appear as candidates of the president’s party in the subsequent election, it is hard to know when they switched to that party. It is likely that they did not bother to switch to the president’s party during the legislative session because no party-line voting takes place and they can thus freely vote with the president for access to state resources. It is possible, therefore, that they switched to the president’s party only a few months before the next election in order to attract their constituents.

Moreover, such incentives to affiliate with the president’s party exist only in midterm elections.11 Because the 1987 Constitution bans presidents from running for reelection and because presidential and congressional elections are held concurrently, uncertainty about the winner has normally been great in post-Marcos presidential elections (Hicken, 2009; Kasuya, 2009), which leads far fewer politicians to seek endorsement from the incumbent president’s party in concurrent elections than in midterm elections. It is thus possible that in midterm elections, many politicians who affiliate with the president’s party are in fact those who stayed with the opposition for the greater part of the legislative session and switched to the president’s party just before the election, but that in concurrent elections, many politicians who affiliate with opposition parties are in fact those who joined the president’s party earlier in the legislative session and switched to the opposition just before the election. Hence, it is difficult to regard politicians who affiliate with a different party in the next election as members of that party during the legislative session.12 Therefore, in this study I use party affiliations of legislators in the current election as a proxy for their access to resources when casting roll-call votes, assuming that legislators stay with their original parties for the greater part of the legislative session.

Government$_{ij}$ is coded ‘1’ if legislator $i$ affiliates with the president’s party (when casting a roll-call vote on bill $j$), and ‘0’ otherwise. Because the governing-party legislators should have little incentive to vote against the president, or the parliamentary majority, irrespective of voter demands for pork or policy (Hypothesis 2), Government$_{ij}$ is expected to have a negative effect on Defect$_{ij}$, irrespective of Education$_{ij}$. However, it is expected that opposition politicians elected from more-developed districts, where policy is often
demanded, are less likely to vote with the president, and hence are more likely to defect from the parliamentary majority’s preferences in legislative voting (*Hypothesis 3*). To test these hypotheses, the proxy for constituent demands (*Education*$_{ij}$) is interacted with the legislator’s original party affiliation (*Government*$_{ij}$).

**Control variables**

First, electoral institutions are controlled for. Since 1998, in Philippine House of Representatives elections, about 80 per cent of legislators are elected from single-member districts (using an open ballot until 2007), while the rest are elected from nationwide party lists. Up to three members from each party can enter the House of Representatives through the party-list election. Because those party-list legislators should respond to the interests of the broader population, they should have stronger incentives to seek policy and weaker incentives to vote with the president for access to the pork pipeline, which would often lead them to vote against the preferences of the parliamentary majority. In addition, about 20 per cent of the members of the House of Representatives were appointed as sectoral (e.g. youth, farmers, women) representatives by the president from 1987 to 1998. These sectoral representatives may have incentives similar to those of the party-list legislators. *List*$_{i}$ is coded ‘1’ if legislator *i* was elected from a party list; ‘0’ otherwise. *Sectoral*$_{i}$ is coded ‘1’ if legislator *i* was appointed as a sectoral representative; ‘0’ otherwise. The expectation is that both *List*$_{i}$ and *Sectoral*$_{i}$ will have a negative effect on *Defect*$_{i}$.

Second, a dummy variable (*Motion*) is included for motions, including resolutions and committee reports, to control for different characteristics between bills and motions. Unlike bills that require roll-call voting, motions are roll-call voted only when requested by legislators, and those motions thus tend be controversial. Hence *Motion* is expected to have a positive effect on *Defect*.

Third, because the 1987 constitution stipulates that ‘no member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms’, a dummy (*Third*$_{i}$) is generated to control for legislator, in her final third term. Because those politicians are ineligible to seek reelection, they should have less incentive to vote with the president for delivering pork to constituents. Thus, *Third*$_{i}$ will correlate positively with *Defect*$_{i}$.

Fourth, in the Philippines, it is common for powerful local elites who built political dynasties in the provinces to have other family members succeed them as representatives of the districts when they retire. Especially after the transition to democracy in 1987, due to the reelection ban after three consecutive terms, those local bosses often have their wives, sons, or daughters run for Congress in the districts for one term and then come back to run in the
following election. *Dynasty* is created to measure the strength of the support base of local legislator, by counting the number of terms for which family members of legislator, have served in the same province since the first Congress in 1946. A larger number in *Dynasty* indicates that the family of legislator, has long been dominant in local politics. Because those powerful local leaders relate closely to the national party leaders who provide them with resources for pork in exchange for voter support from the locality in the presidential election (Land, 1965), they should be more likely to vote with the legislative majority; hence *Dynasty* is expected to correlate negatively with *Defect*.

Finally, legislative session fixed effects are controlled for: a dummy variable for each session is included in the model to control for unobservable factors specific to each session.

**Empirical results**

**Parliament’s cohesiveness**

Figure 1 shows the proportion of roll-call voted bills and motions that received simple majority consents, over 95 per cent consents, and unanimous consents, respectively, in the Philippine House of Representatives since 1987. The dataset includes 6289 bills and motions (see Table A1), and only five of them were voted down. In the 8th Congress, the first post-Marcos legislature, all 1303 bills and motions presented on the floor (in the third reading) were passed by roll-call vote with simple majority consent with the exception of two motions, which indicates that, as expected in Hypothesis 1, the legislature faced extremely little obstruction in legislative voting. Even more striking is that 96.8 per cent of bills and motions were passed with over 95 per cent consents; 92.6 per cent of bills and motions were passed unanimously (see Appendix Table A2). That is, most of the time, the legislators voted affirmatively on bills and motions that required roll-call voting. Furthermore, except for the 13th Congress, the proportion of bills and motions passed with unanimous or near-unanimous (over 95 per cent) consent even increased over time, keeping the bill-passage rate (with simple majority consent) extremely high. In the 12th Congress, for instance, 97.7 per cent of bills and motions were passed without a single objection; 98.9 per cent were passed with less than or equal to 5 per cent objection.

In short, in this extremely pork-oriented context, politicians pass bills with little obstructionism because they logroll pork-barrel legislation and because few of them care about bills with some policy goals, which supports Hypothesis 1. Even if they do care and oppose certain bills, once those bills are put on the floor, requiring roll-call voting, it is often difficult for them to object when those bills are presented on behalf of the president. For instance, it is a norm
in the Philippine Congress that legislators should help pass the president’s bills, which is called presidential mandate. Furthermore, this tendency towards unanimity generally gets stronger as the effects on electoral gains of delivered benefits using government resources become evident.

**Individual level voting defection**

Figure 1, however, also reveals that a handful of bills do receive some negative votes. The proposed ordered logit models of voting defection help to investigate who cast those negative votes in this homogenous legislature dominated by pork-seeking politicians. Table 1 shows estimation results of the models; overall, they match all the expectations. In the pork-dominant system, as voters’ socioeconomic conditions improve, their representatives are more likely to defect from the legislative majority; thus the coefficient on Education is consistently positive and significant. Also as expected, politicians who affiliated with the president’s party in the election are less likely to defect, and hence the sign on Government is negative. In addition, it appears that the voting behaviour of the governing-party legislators does not change substantially according to the voters’ socioeconomic status, as the sign on Education*Government is not significant.

Model 1 tests the effects of constituents’ educational level on their representative’s legislative behaviour. An easy way to understand the coefficient is by comparing the choice of two legislators, one from a poor district where no voters have received tertiary education beyond high school (District A) and the other from a more-developed district where half of the voters have completed some form of tertiary education (District B). The latter is 2.24 times more likely to defect (‘not defect’ to ‘abstain’, or ‘abstain’ to ‘defect’).
from the parliamentary majority’s preferences in legislative voting than the former, all else being equal. Model 2, on the other hand, tests the impacts of politicians’ access to resources on their legislative behaviour, revealing that governing-party members who are in the party with access to the pork pipeline are 3.39 times less likely to defect from the parliamentary majority than their counterparts in the opposition, all else equal.

Model 3 includes the interaction variable of voter demands and access to resources along with its constitutive terms. First, a hypothetical legislator from the more-developed district (District B) is 2.18 times more likely to defect from the parliamentary majority’s preferences in legislative voting, compared with her counterpart from the poor district (District A), holding other factors constant. Second, the president’s party legislators are three times less likely to defect from the parliamentary majority than are opposition legislators, all else equal. Third, it seems that those governing-party members are less likely to defect regardless of voters’ socio-economic status, or voter demands, as the interaction variable lacks statistical significance.

Using Model 3, Figure 2 shows how an interaction between voter demands and access to resources influences legislative behaviour. Whether legislators are in the party with access to state resources affects their choices whether to defect from the parliamentary majority in casting a roll-call vote. In less-developed areas where only 10 per cent of voters have ever received tertiary education, for instance, the predicted probability of their representatives to defect from the parliamentary majority is over 8 per cent ($p = .085$) if they are in the opposition; the probability, however, decreases to 3 per cent ($p$

### Table 1. Ordered logit models of voting defection in the Philippine House of Representatives, 1987–2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voter demands &amp; access to resources</th>
<th>Est</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Est</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Est</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Model 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Model 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>−1.22</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>−1.10</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education*Government</td>
<td>−0.39</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motion</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynasty</td>
<td>−0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Congress</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Congress</td>
<td>−0.33</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>−1.17</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>−1.06</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Congress</td>
<td>−0.18</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>−0.33</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>−0.28</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Congress</td>
<td>−0.16</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>−0.74</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>−0.73</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Congress</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log-likelihood = −10007.54

$n = 37167; * = .05, ** = .01.$
= .029) if they are in the president’s party. It deserves attention that the access to resources has considerably greater effects on the probability of voting defection for opposition legislators in more-developed areas where voters often desire policy over pork. Where 60 per cent of voters have received tertiary education, for instance, the predicted probability of voting defection increases slightly to .051 for governing-party legislators, but the probability jumps to .169 for opposition legislators. Although the probability almost doubles for both governing and opposition-party legislators, the increase from .029 to .051 (for governing-party legislators) is far less substantial than the increase from .085 to .169 (for opposition legislators). In addition, .051 is still a low probability of voting defection—even lower than that of opposition legislators to defect in less-developed areas. Therefore, we can conclude that, in the pork-dominant system, legislators in the president’s party are less likely to defect from the parliamentary majority, irrespective of voter demands for pork or policy, compared to those in the opposition (Hypothesis 2), while their counterparts in the opposition are more likely to defect as voters’ demands for policy increase (Hypothesis 3).

Figure 2. Voter demands, access to resources, and legislative behaviour.

Note: Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
Finally, since most legislators vote more than once during a legislative session, the observations are not independent. Thus, the results of the ordered logit models are compared with those of fixed-effects ordered logit models. The results of both kinds of models are similar, and hence the concern of the non-independent observations can be safely disregarded.17

Discussions and conclusion

The aim of this article is to explore how legislators behave in extremely pork-oriented, or pork-dominant, systems where no party-line voting takes place and politicians strive to deliver particularistic benefits to constituents. To understand the legislative behaviour in such particularistic contexts, we need to investigate how an interaction between voter demands and access to resources affects legislators’ decisions to vote with the political leader who controls access to resources for pork. For instance, in the Philippines, where pork allocation is centralised in the president, politicians should be willing to vote with the president, irrespective of their party affiliations. Hence, legislative obstructionism should be extremely weak because almost all legislators engage in logrolling of pork-barrel legislation and vote with the president on policy bills. Only opposition legislators where voters demand policy should have strong incentives to defect from the parliamentary majority’s preferences in the highly cohesive parliament dominated by pork-seeking politicians. Using new data on roll-call votes in the post-authoritarian Philippine House of Representatives, the study finds statistically and substantively significant evidence for these arguments. First, most bills are passed by unanimous or near-unanimous consent. Second, the president’s party members almost always vote with the parliamentary majority, regardless of voter demands. Finally, opposition legislators in more-developed districts where voters often desire policy over pork are more likely to defect from the legislative majority.

This research makes two contributions. First, the paper expands the study of legislative voting to pork-dominant systems. Most studies on the legislative behaviour have investigated voting defection by legislators from their party majority, assuming that party-line voting takes place all the time. They argue that opposition party politicians in less-developed regions tend to defect from the party line (party majority) more frequently because the majority of their constituents demand particularistic goods, which leads them to vote with the president or the governor who controls pork pipelines (Desposato, 2001, 2006). Conversely, I demonstrate that in the pork-dominant system where most legislators just pass any bills submitted on the House floor, opposition party legislators in more-developed regions tend to defect from the parliamentary majority because they sometimes have a reason to object to policy bills as their constituents often desire policy over
pork. In other words, normally, parties seek to deliver policy (as well as pork) and party leaders thus impose discipline on their rank-and-file. In this context, it is opposition politicians in less-developed regions (where voters desire pork) who have strong incentives to defect from the majority of members of their party (Desposato, 2001). In the pork-dominant context where no discipline is imposed on party rank-and-file, however, it is opposition politicians in more-developed regions (where voters desire policy) who tend to defect from the majority of the members of the parliament.

In addition, this varying pattern of voting defection implies that politicians pay close attention to voter demands when casting a roll-call vote in order to improve their electoral chances in the subsequent election. Hence, voters’ demands for pork foster personalistic politicians who pursue access to resources harming party discipline and loyalty, whereas voters’ demands for policy promote programmatic accountability, leading their representatives to undermine unusually high levels of voting unity in the pork-dominant parliament. This study, therefore, can offer evidence-based advice to would-be reformers in less-developed countries who want to replace their pork-centric politics with policy-centric politics. Because the poor desire pork and politicians are responsive to such demands, we should focus on improving voters’ socio-economic conditions to promote policy-oriented party competition.

To be sure, the significance of these findings should not be overstated. These analyses are based on the fragile assumption that all members of the House of Representatives remain in their original parties for most part of the legislative session, which may be unlikely in the extremely personalistic context where almost all legislators desire to side with the president. As a result, the true probability of real opposition party members (who indeed remained in the opposition) to defect from the legislative majority might be greater than the estimated probability of voting defection among the assumed opposition in this study. This encourages future research on other pork-dominant personalistic systems that provide more accurate information about the party affiliation of legislators.

Regardless, the results of this study demonstrate the importance of considering the powerful interaction between voters’ demands and access to resources when analyzing the legislative voting of their representatives. To explain voting defection of individual politicians properly, we need to assess how the type of benefits desired by their constituents differs from that desired by constituents of the party majority, and whether those politicians are in the party with access to resources when voters demand pork.

Furthermore, the findings of this study can be applicable to the legislative behaviour in parliamentary systems, as well. Because governments are dependent on a legislative majority to exist, party leaders tend to impose stronger discipline on their party rank-and-file, and voting defection from the party
line is thus rarer in parliamentarism than in presidentialism (Clark, Golder, & Golder, 2009; Diermeier & Feddersen, 1998). Where voters desire pork, however, opposition-party legislators should have strong incentives to vote with the prime minister in order to gain access to state resources. Moreover, in the pork-dominant system where almost all politicians are eager for access to pork pipelines, the supermajority of parliamentary members should always support the prime minister’s bills, and opposition party legislators whose constituents demand policy will sometimes have strong incentives to defect from the parliamentary majority in legislative voting. Hence, in parliamentary systems voters’ demands and parties’ access to resources are expected to affect the legislative behaviour of politicians in the same way as they do in presidential systems.

Notes

1. In parliamentary systems, prime ministers control access to state resources. For the simplicity of the argument, this study considers the legislative voting only in presidentialism, and the applicability of the findings of the study to parliamentarism is discussed in the concluding section.

2. Few empirical studies have been conducted on the effects of voters’ socio-economic conditions on legislative voting, however. Desposato (2006) shows that party switching is more frequent among legislators from less-developed districts, in which the majority of voters are poor and less educated, in order to deliver individual/local benefits.

3. The study disregards the Philippine Senate because its members are elected in the national constituency, and they thus do not engage in pork-barreling for their constituents.

4. Interview with Wilfrido V. Villacorta, member of Constitutional Commission of 1986 (selected from academic sector), Makati City, 25 May 2010.

5. See Shin (2013, p. 104) for the details of the candidate-centeredness of the Philippine FPTP.


7. In the Philippine Congress, bills on third (final) reading, overriding a presidential veto, and approval of a resolution affirming or overriding the articles of impeachment require roll-call voting (Paras & Santos, 1996, p. 38); other resolutions, motions, and committee reports, however, require roll-call voting only if it is requested by legislators.


9. Even the Congressional Record lacks the information about legislators’ party affiliations. A political observer said that even party leaders could not provide a list of their party members because some members might have switched to another party while the leaders were making the list (Interview with Nancy T. Tuason, Supervising Legislative Staff Officer III of the Legislative Library, Quezon City, 24 September 2008).
10. About 20% of the members of the House of Representatives who are elected via party lists are prohibited from switching parties.
11. The term of office for the president is six years, while that for members of the House of Representatives is three years.
12. If we do, we are likely to commit a Type I error (false positive, treating opposition-party members who stay put for the greater part of the legislative session and switched to the president’s party just before the subsequent election as those who are with the governing party during the entire session) for midterm elections and to commit a Type II error (false negative, treating opposition politicians who switched to the president’s party earlier in the legislative session and switched again to another opposition party with a strong presidential candidate just before the subsequent election as those who did not join the president’s party at all) for concurrent elections.
13. I count those who use the same family name of legislator, in the same province as family members of legislator.
14. Abstention is omitted because it does not count toward the total number of votes cast for bills in the Philippine Congress.
15. Interview with Lambert Ramirez, 20 May 2010.
16. \((e^{1.61})^{0.5} = (5.00)^{0.5} = 2.24\).
17. This study does not employ the fixed-effects ordered logit model because using the fixed-effects models would eliminate the control variables for the legislative session fixed effects.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work was supported by Korea University [Grant Number K1400628].

Notes on contributor

Jae Hyeok Shin is an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. His research interests include electoral systems, parties, legislative politics, and political/economic development in new democracies, especially in East Asia. His works have appeared in journals including Party Politics, Political Science Quarterly, Government & Opposition, Democratization, and Journal of East Asian Studies.

References


Appendix


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Bills Roll-called</th>
<th>Bills w/ negative votes</th>
<th>Motions Roll-called</th>
<th>Motions w/ negative votes</th>
<th>Total Roll-called</th>
<th>Total w/ negative votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th (1987–1992)</td>
<td>1293</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th (1992–1995)</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th (1995–1998)</td>
<td>1091</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1095</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th (1998–2001)</td>
<td>1154</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1173</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th (2001–2004)</td>
<td>1097</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1102</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th (2004–2007)</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6237</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6289</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Motions include resolutions and committee reports.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>100 per cent</th>
<th>&gt; 95 per cent</th>
<th>&gt; 50 per cent</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th (1987–1992)</td>
<td>0.926</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>1303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th (1992–1995)</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th (1995–1998)</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>1095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th (1998–2001)</td>
<td>0.971</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>1173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th (2001–2004)</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th (2004–2007)</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>6289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>